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Abstract
There are acute disparities in pharmaceutical access between developing and industrialized
countries. Developing countries make up approximately 80% of the world's population but only
represent approximately 20% of global pharmaceutical consumption. Among the many barriers to
drug access are the potential consequences of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. Many developing countries have recently modified their patent laws to
conform to the TRIPS standards, given the 2005 deadline for developing countries. Safeguards to
protect public health have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement; however, in practice
governments may be reluctant to exercise such rights given concern about the international trade
and political ramifications. The Doha Declaration and the recent Decision on the Implementation
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health may provide
more freedom for developing countries in using these safeguards. This paper focuses on Ghana, a
developing country that recently changed its patent laws to conform to TRIPS standards. We
examine Ghana's patent law changes in the context of the Doha Declaration and assess their
meaning for access to drugs of its population. We discuss new and existing barriers, as well as
possible solutions, to provide policy-makers with lessons learned from the Ghanaian experience.
Introduction
The disparity in pharmaceutical access between developed
and developing countries is stark. Developing countries
make up approximately 80% of the world's population
but only represent approximately 20% of global pharma-
ceutical consumption[1]. Market failures, government
failures and income differences account for this persisting
inequity[2]. Specifically, high drug costs, weak or corrupt
institutions, contributing to less than effective pharma-
ceutical purchasing and distribution systems, and the
potential consequences of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement all constrain
drug access.
Many developing countries have recently modified their
patent laws to conform to TRIPS standards, raising the
urgency of TRIPS' potentially detrimental impact on drug
supply and access. However, recent developments such as
the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
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may offer developing countries more freedom to use
TRIPS safeguards to address public health needs.
This article focuses on Ghana, a developing country that
recently changed its patent laws to conform to TRIPS
standards. While Ghana has made strides in improving
public health, the country has urgent and serious health
needs that cannot be met by the existing system. Improv-
ing pharmaceutical access is one of the core challenges fac-
ing the Government. As such, there is a menu of choices
available for possible use. These include "Paragraph
6,"compulsory licensing, parallel importing and attract-
ing investment for the local production of essential medi-
cines to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. In
this paper, we discuss a selection of pharmaceutical policy
choices available to governments that may lead to
improved access to medicines. We do this specifically
through the case of Ghana. As a test case, Ghana repre-
sents the dilemma faced by many developing countries -
"make or buy." That is to say, should a government invest
more in local production or continue to import medi-
cines? In short, we examine Ghana's patent law changes in
the context of the Doha Declaration and assess their
meaning for access to drugs of its population. New and
existing barriers will be discussed and options for address-
ing them proposed, to provide policy-makers with lessons
learned from the Ghanaian experience.
This paper is based on research conducted for the UK
Department for International Development (DfID)[3].
Our study implicitly focuses on the basic pharmaceutical
public policy issues that currently face decision-makers in
Ghana: 1) how to improve pharmaceutical coverage for
the majority of Ghanaians and most importantly for the
poor; 2) how to make treatment and drugs more afforda-
ble; and 3) how to ensure the government gets maximum
value from its pharmaceutical budget. We collected data
through: a review of "hard" documents (recent academic
literature, policy documents, recent country studies, laws
and regulations relating to drug access issues in Ghana
and internationally), interviews with key stakeholders
and informants to identify major gaps in drug access in
Ghana, and inputs from the Access to Medicines Ghana
Initiative Advisory Group.
We organize our paper as follows: first, we describe Ghana
and its pharmaceutical system; second, we discuss the
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration; third, we dis-
cuss Ghana's 1992 Patent Law and 2003 Patent Act;
fourth, we discuss Ghana's new Patent Act in the context
of the Doha Declaration and of pharmaceutical access in
Ghana, followed by conclusions.
The State of Pharmaceuticals in Ghana
Ghana has made significant improvements in its overall
health status over the past few decades, with life expect-
ancy reaching 57 years in 2002 and infant mortality
declining to 56 per 1000 live births. Despite these
improvements, there are significant health issues facing
the country: approximately 3.6% of the population is
infected with HIV/AIDS, malaria accounts for 40% of out-
patient visits and 25% of mortality under the age of five
and the annual risk of tuberculosis infection is approxi-
mately 1–2%[4]. High mortality rates, frequent epidem-
ics, unequal access to health services, and uneven health
outcomes throughout the country are also major prob-
lems.
Pharmaceuticals are available in many health facilities
across the country; however, access is largely limited due
to financial barriers for most of the population, particu-
larly the poor. According to the World Bank, Ghana had a
per capita income of US$380 (2004), which is about one-
fifth below the average of US$490 for sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, a recent study indicates that 40 percent of
Ghana's population earns less than minimum wage with
this proportion increasing in rural areas[5]. As a result, the
poverty level makes it difficult for patients to purchase
drugs. For example, HIV/AIDS patients receiving one-
month of anti-retroviral therapy paid for by the Global
Fund are still required to pay 10% of the costs of medi-
cines, at approximately 50,000 cedis (over $US 5). In real
terms, it would require a person who is earning the mini-
mum wage more than 5 working days to cover the co-pay-
ment. In a small random sample of interviews with
patients at the HIV/AIDS Clinic in St. Martin's Hospital,
Agomanya, we observed that many patients were not
working at all and had to borrow money from family
members to cover this co-payment.
Until recently, Ghana's public health and pharmaceutical
system operated under the "cash & carry" (C&C) model,
which assumes that drug co-payments can help finance
and, therefore, improve the delivery of primary health
care services. This system involved a series of self-financ-
ing revolving drug funds (RDF), which cascaded down
each institutional level, marking up the basic purchase
price for drug products to obtain revenue to re-supply the
products. Additively, these mark-ups could also increase
the price of a drug well beyond the reach of most Ghana-
ians. The government provided exemptions for co-pay-
ments for specific categories, including TB patients,
psychiatric patients, children under five years of age, the
indigent, pregnant women and the elderly. Identifying
who is truly indigent is difficult to do in Ghana because
poverty is viewed from a socio-cultural point of view as
"shameful" and many poor people are reluctant to admit
it. Essentially, this system did not achieve its intent to pro-Globalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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vide widespread affordable access to medicines for the
population.
The Government of Ghana declared its intention to abol-
ish the C&C system and passed a National Health Insur-
ance Bill in 2003, which recently has been implemented.
Several districts have also introduced health insurance in
their localities. These insurance measures may serve to
improve access to medicines; however, their effectiveness
is yet to be observed. Importantly, the draft minimum
package for pharmaceuticals includes medications for
outpatient and inpatient services. Antiretrovirals are cov-
ered under different arrangements using the Global Fund
to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Ministry of
Health is reviewing exemption policies and the proposed
National Health Insurance drug list to ensure consistency
with the Essential Drug List. Despite the difficulties noted
above, the Insurance system hopes to use local structures
to identify who is "poor" to ensure these categories can
access care. A national pricing policy, informed by a com-
prehensive examination of pharmaceutical pricing mod-
els internationally, can also facilitate better financial
access of the population to medicines.
Pharmaceutical mark-ups are another policy issue that
needs reform. The international research-based and
generic pharmaceutical industries provide discounted
medicines to Ghana, however once products arrive in
Ghana, mark-ups between 11% to 275% wipe out many
price advantages[3]. Tax and tariff rates vary but are appli-
cable to all medicines, except public sector procurement
done according to the Essential Drug List. In the private
sector, depending on the local agent or manufacturer, the
cost of antiretrovirals can exceed 32.5% more than the
discounted price obtained through the Accelerated Access
Initiative (AAI). In some cases, the private health facility
adds further margins to increase the cost. In order to effec-
tively address mark-ups, national tax, tariff and mark-up
policies need to be reviewed to determine what policy
changes could facilitate more affordable prices. Govern-
ment can regulate wholesale and retail mark-ups on
essential medicines. Policies regarding the private sector
management chain and public sector supply management
chain need examination and adjustment to make medi-
cines more affordable for patients.
Ghana has potential to supply more of its medicine needs;
local manufacturing accounts for 20% of the pharmaceu-
tical market share. There are about 30 pharmaceutical
manufacturing facilities in Ghana and about 17–18 pro-
duce all year round. Most raw materials needed for local
manufacture are imported and subject to duties, taxes and
tariffs, which erode the potential cost advantage that local
manufacturing can provide. Currently, manufacturers pay
12.5% VAT (Value Added Tax), 0.5% EDIF (Economic
Development Investment Fund), 0.5% ECOWAS levy,
handling and inspection charges, GCNet charges (0.004%
of cost and freight)[3]. However, Schedule 1A of the 34
materials of Active Ingredients of Essential Medicines are
exempt from tax. Manufacturers apply a mark up that can
range from 10 to 40%. Wholesalers add a further 10 to
20% when selling to the retailer. Then, the retailer adds
another margin of 20 to 50%. All of these margins obvi-
ously increase the price of the drug for the patient, thereby
contributing to the financial barrier to medicines. To help
local industry, the government restricts the importation of
17 pharmaceutical products (e.g. paracetamol, chloro-
quine). Local production is beneficial given that it also
provides employment for the population; however the
barrier of limited human and technological capacity must
first be overcome.
The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration
By way of brief background, the TRIPS Agreement pro-
vides minimum standards for intellectual property law
and procedures and remedies that should be available so
rights holders can enforce their rights effectively[6]. The
default principle concerning patents is that they should be
available for any invention, whether product or process,
in all fields of technology without discrimination[6].
With respect to pharmaceutical patents, the minimum
TRIPS obligations include 20 years of patent protection
from the inventor's filing date (Article 33), patent rights
free of discrimination against the origin of invention or
production (Article 27.1), and exclusive marketing rights
for the entire patent duration (Article 28)[7]. Transitional
periods are granted before TRIPS requirements for patent
protection must be met; the deadline for least-developing
country members was ultimately extended to 2016 (Arti-
cles 65 and 66)[6].
The TRIPS Agreement also outlines provisions around pat-
ent rights for member states. For example, Articles 8.2,
31(k) and 40 offer flexibility to member countries to pre-
vent or remedy anti-competitive practice[8]. Article 30
facilitates an early working provision, allowing the lim-
ited use of an invention without the patent holder's
authorization[9]. Generic companies can use this provi-
sion to obtain product approval, facilitating immediate
entry into the market after patent expiration. Article 31
permits a government to issue a compulsory license to a
third party without the patent holder's consent, if justified
in the public interest[7]. Compulsory licensing allows
governments to pursue the local production of medicines
as one strategy to improve access of the population to
essential medicines. Parallel importing, legally pursuant
to TRIPS Article 8.1 and Article 6, is the import and resale
in a state without the consent of a patent holder, of a pat-
ented product in another market. Its rationale is to allow
governments and others to "price shop" internationallyGlobalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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for pharmaceutical products, based on the underlying
principle that the patent holder has been rewarded
through the first sale and thus has "exhausted" rights.
Compulsory licensing and parallel importation are the
focus of this paper.
In practice, governments may realistically be reluctant to
exercise TRIPS provisions given some concern about polit-
ical and economic ramifications, particularly in the area
of trade sanctions. The Doha Declaration, issued by the
WTO in November 2001, partially aimed to address this
concern. It states " [the] TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent members from taking measures to pro-
tect public health... [and it] should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to pro-
mote access to medicines for all" [emphasis added][10].
Furthermore, the Declaration specifically reaffirms mem-
ber countries' rights to determine the grounds on which
compulsory licenses may be issued, to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or circumstance of
extreme urgency, and to determine their own regime for
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
The WTO has, however, not explicitly defined the legal
status of the Declaration. An unofficial explanation of the
Declaration, available on the WTO website, states that the
Declaration provides "important guidance" to individual
members and WTO dispute settlement bodies in the inter-
pretation of TRIPS[11]. Correa identifies the Declaration
as a "strong political statement" and "a 'subsequent agree-
ment' between the parties regarding the interpretation of
a treaty or the application of its provisions, under Article
31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Trea-
ties"[12]. Ultimately, the functional application of the
Declaration is to interpret TRIPS[13], however as Reich-
man and Hasenzahl note[14], the exact legal status of the
Declaration will not be clear until its practical application
has been observed through future WTO panels and the
Appellate Body.
The Declaration was partially an effort to interpret Article
31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, which states that compul-
sory licensing shall be "predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market." Given that the majority of develop-
ing countries lack the domestic capacity or technical
expertise to manufacture on-patent pharmaceuticals, the
interpretation of this terminology is crucial for ensuring
access to medicine for the poor in many developing coun-
tries. On August 30, 2003, the WTO issued a temporary
solution, the "Decision on the Implementation of Para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health"[15]. The Decision temporarily waives Arti-
cle 31(f), permitting countries with local manufacturing
capacity to issue compulsory licenses to produce and
export drugs to countries without adequate manufactur-
ing capacity, in return for a pledge from countries not to
use the Decision "...to pursue industrial or commercial
policy objectives"[16]. Eligible importing countries
include least-developed countries or a country that can
demonstrate insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for
the purpose of meeting its needs. No country, at the time
of writing, has yet notified the WTO of its intention to
operate as an importer under this decision. Countries may
in fact be reluctant to do so as a result of economic and
political pressure.
Ghana's Patent Law
The Patent Law of 1992 provided for the protection of pat-
ents in Ghana until recently. This law provided that all
inventions, products or processes which were "new,
involve an inventive step and are industrially applicable,"
were patentable (Sec.2)[17]. Pharmaceuticals were con-
sidered patentable inventions and patent duration was 10
years (Sec.31(1)). The law permitted compulsory licens-
ing in cases of no or insufficient local working of the pat-
ented invention (Sec.45(1)), based on the
interdependence of patents (Sec.46), and for products or
processes declared to be of vital importance to defence,
economic or public health interests (Sec.47). Section 30
considered the patent holder's right exhausted only when
he put his patented product on the Ghanaian market, ren-
dering parallel importation impossible. To meet all TRIPS
obligations and take advantage of its safeguards, the Gha-
naian government reviewed the Patent Law of 1992 and
passed a bill to replace it in early 2003.
The changes introduced in the 2003 Patent Act removed
some legal tools that may have helped improve access to
medicines[18]. Under Section 7 of the 1992 Patent Law,
the Ghanaian government had the authority to temporar-
ily exclude inventions or discoveries, such as pharmaceu-
ticals, from patentability "... in the interests of national
security, economy, health or any other national concern."
The 2003 Patent Act removed this exception. Arguably,
the government of Ghana could have excluded specific
pharmaceutical products from patentability as a tempo-
rary means to address urgent public health concerns. Tem-
porary excludability is particularly useful when
procedural requirements to compulsory licensing cannot
be met[9]. However, as Correa explains, a literal interpre-
tation of Article 27.1 does not allow the exclusion of phar-
maceuticals[9]. He notes that under TRIPS Article 27.2
ordre public and Article 8.1 "...pharmaceuticals might con-
ceivably be excluded from patentability, but neither
appear sufficient to justify this exclusion except in limited
circumstances,"[9]. In any case, the option of using tem-
porary excludability appears unviable at the present time.Globalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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Section 13(2) addresses the royalty rate for compulsory
licenses: "... [t]he exploitation of the invention...shall be
subject to the payment to the owner of an adequate remu-
neration, taking into account the economic value of the
Minister's decision as determined in the decision..."[18].
Adequate remuneration is undefined, allowing for the
negotiation of prices, which could have either positive or
negative effects on price control and access to medicines.
The Ghanaian government has since developed adminis-
trative guidelines, proposing the creation of a committee
that would determine the level of compensation to be
given to a patent holder. It proposed that remuneration
for drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria not
exceed 1% of the retail price. In Canada, a country with
extensive history of compulsory licensing, a royalty rate of
4% was used[19]. Furthermore, Canada's recent Jean Chré-
tien Pledge to Africa Act may offer useful guidance, as the
royalty rate varies from 4 to 0.02% depending upon the
importing country's standing on the UN Human Develop-
ment Index[20].
Section 12(1) of the 2003 Patent Act incorporated Article
33 of TRIPS, doubling the period of patent protection to
20 years. The result will be a delay in the entry of generic
competition, and since generic competition tends to
lower drug prices, a reduction in overall cost-savings is
likely[21]. This provision does not offer any flexibility to
member countries; therefore the ensuing barriers will
require circumvention via other TRIPS safeguards or pol-
icy alternatives. As noted earlier, the Ghana's major dis-
ease burden includes malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS. While
these diseases can be treated with off-patent medications,
extended patent life will be problematic in situations
where no other therapeutic options are available[22]. Spe-
cifically, evidence of resistance to traditional antimalarial
therapy (e.g., chloroquine) exists and patients who
develop resistance to anti-retroviral medications or expe-
rience treatment failure will need access to new, patented
medicines in the future. The increase in duration of patent
protection impedes Ghana's autonomy over defining
their population's therapeutic needs.
Changes were also introduced in the 2003 Patent Act that
may promote access to medicines. Section 11(4a) of the
2003 Patent Act allows the international exhaustion of
intellectual property rights. This legalizes the parallel
importation of lower-priced pharmaceuticals from other
countries into Ghana, which will be discussed in detail
below. Compulsory licenses can now be issued in circum-
stances of anti-competitive practice, which allows Ghana
to remedy abusive practices and excessive prices, poten-
tially increasing the availability of affordable medi-
cines[9]. Potential also exists to use TRIPS' anti-
competitive provisions, accompanied by appropriate
national competition policy, to promote the development
of the local pharmaceutical industry[8]. The successful
suit by the Aids Law Project (ALP) against two major phar-
maceutical companies with the South African Competi-
tion Commission in 2002 illustrates this potential. Other
positive changes include new procedures in granting com-
pulsory licenses: a waiver to seek a voluntary license in
"cases of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency," (Section 13(10)) and ministerial
authorization instead of the previous lengthy and
resource-intensive requirement of legislative authoriza-
tion (Sec.13(1)).
The 2003 Patent Act widens the provision for issuing a
non-voluntary license under local working requirements.
Local working requires the manufacturing of a patented
product to a minimum degree within the country, poten-
tially stimulating growth of the local pharmaceutical
industry. Specifically, the 2003 Patent Act allows non-vol-
untary licenses in situations where "...the patented inven-
tion is not exploited or is insufficiently exploited by
working the invention locally, or by importation in the
country," (Sec.14(1)) [18]. Whereas the 1992 Patent Act
listed four relatively specific instances, where the compul-
sory license could be invoked if the invention was not
being worked, the 2003 Patent Act makes this more open-
ended. The limits of this new clause will likely be drawn
by the TRIPS agreement and legislative intent during draft-
ing the Patent Bill in Ghanaian courts; its exact interpreta-
tion is still unclear. Given the USTR complaint against
Brazil regarding its local working requirement, however,
the current political feasibility of including and invoking
such a clause is tenuous[19].
How will these developments impact access to medicines 
in Ghana?
Compulsory Licensing
Ghana's 2003 Patent Act, TRIPS and the Doha Declaration
offer Ghana sufficient legal ground to use compulsory
licensing to address its public health concerns. Compul-
sory licensing can be used for either local pharmaceutical
production or importation, however the latter may be
more feasible in the short-term. This will be discussed
below. Paragraph 5b of the Declaration explicitly reaf-
firms the right of countries to "...grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licenses are granted." As Correa notes, Para-
graph 5b merely states the obvious: Article 31 of TRIPS
only requires certain conditions for the granting of com-
pulsory licenses, "but it does not limit the grounds on
which such licenses can be granted"[12]. Paragraph 5(c)
further facilitates compulsory licensing through the recog-
nition that "public health crises ... can represent a national
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency" and
clarifies that members need not declare a "fully-fledged
national emergency"[23].Globalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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From a political perspective, the feasibility of using com-
pulsory licensing to address public health concerns has
also become more favourable. One event suggesting this
is the abandonment of a pharmaceutical industry lawsuit
seeking to remove South Africa's amendment in its Medi-
cines and Related Substances Act, which would permit
compulsory licensing and parallel importation. The suit
was abandoned due to international pressure and the
resolve of the South African government. Other events
include Brazil's successful use of the threat of compulsory
licensing in negotiations to obtain significant discounts of
40–65% on patented antiretrovirals from Roche and
Merck and a public statement by Boehringer-Engelheim in
2003 that it will not interfere in the issuance of compul-
sory licenses and will respect the Doha Declaration[24].
The World Health Organization (WHO) also explicitly
supports developing countries in the use of TRIPS safe-
guards to promote access to medicines[25]. Given these
developments, political and legal repercussions from
other powerful countries are less likely. For a country to
make effective use of compulsory licensing a number of
other potential barriers must be addressed and certain
requirements must be met.
Effective implementation of compulsory licensing
requires the adequate know-how and administrative
infrastructure, however many developing countries,
including Ghana, do not have this requisite capacity[26].
Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement requires developed
countries to provide technical assistance, "on request and
on mutually agreed terms and conditions", to developing
and least-developed countries to help address such gaps.
Developing countries like Ghana should use this provi-
sion and approach developed countries and international
organizations for support.
The usefulness of compulsory licensing, for local produc-
tion or as a negotiating tool, largely depends on whether
the appropriate technological and production capacity
exists and whether appropriate human resources are avail-
able. The experience of Brazil provides an illustrative
example on this point. Cohen and Lybecker argue that
Brazil's success is based on three main factors: first, the
threat posed by Brazil is credible in that it has a viable
local industry; second, Brazil's market is "...one of the
largest in Latin America and among the top ten globally;"
third, Brazil initiated its threats with the strong support of
the international community[24]. As we noted earlier, the
international community continues to be supportive of
developing countries' use of compulsory licensing to
address public health needs. In comparison to Brazil,
however, Ghana's pharmaceutical market is small which
may make the process economically unfeasible. The via-
bility of Ghana's local industry is also questionable as
approximately 30 pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities
exist but only 17–18 produce throughout the entire year.
Careful cost-benefit analysis of the value of domestic pro-
duction versus the importation of pharmaceuticals is nec-
essary to determine whether Ghana can benefit from
compulsory licensing for local production, as it is com-
monly more economical to import medicines than to pro-
duce them locally.
Parallel Importation
Parallel imports are of particular importance in meeting
public health needs since the pharmaceutical industry
generally sets differential prices globally for the same
medicine. Thus, parallel importation of a patented medi-
cine from a country where it is sold at a lower price will
enable more patients in the importing country to gain
access to cheaper drugs (whether international exhaustion
applies to medicines produced under compulsory licens-
ing, however, is still a live debate; see Abbott 2002). Para-
graph 5(d) of the Declaration explicitly reaffirms
members' freedom to determine their own regimes for the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights without chal-
lenge. Ghana's 2003 Patent Act finally facilitates this by
incorporating this provision; it allows parallel importa-
tion only under the condition that the product to be
imported is already "put on the market in any country by
the owner of the patent or with the owner's consent,"
(Sec.11(4a)).
Parallel importing introduces more challenges. Adminis-
trative capacity issues exist with parallel importation as
with compulsory licensing. In Ghana, import permits for
companies engaged in the parallel importation of drugs
are difficult to obtain at this time, which may pose
another barrier. Parallel importation increases the oppor-
tunity for the influx of sub-standard products and thus
attendant recall problems. Some critics argue that parallel
importing acts as a disincentive to differential pricing by
research-based pharmaceutical companies due to a risk of
diversion of low-cost products to lucrative, developed
country markets; however, as Outterson notes "...empiri-
cal evidence to date does not indicate a sizable arbitrage
market in ARVs from low income countries into the high
income countries"[20]. Furthermore, there have been no
reported cases of diverted drugs from Ghana to other mar-
kets. The European Commission's (EC) May 2003 Regula-
tion to facilitate differential pricing may provide another
option while lessening some of the industry's re-exporta-
tion concerns. The EC regulation provides anti-diversion
measures against specific pharmaceutical products and
requires manufacturers to reduce their essential medicines
export prices to developing countries by "75% off the
average 'ex factory' price in OECD countries, or at the cost
of production plus 15%"[27]. If parallel importation is to
be useful to Ghana, administrative, institutional and
managerial capacity must be developed for effectiveGlobalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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implementation, to prevent the unlawful importation and
exportation of products and to ensure quality control.
Importation Pursuant to Paragraph 6
If Ghana decides against using its' local industry for the
production of generic medicines, Paragraph 6 may offer
another potential solution. While some critics have
viewed this provision favourably, others have criticized it
as too administratively complex for developing countries.
Correa explains that the implementation of the Paragraph
6 Decision requires a number of steps, among which
include: 1) in most cases, compulsory licenses issued by
importing and exporting countries, 2) the importing
country's establishment of insufficient or no local manu-
facturing capacity in the specified pharmaceutical sector,
3) importer notification to the WTO of its intention to use
the system detailing product(s) requested and quantities
(accompanied by confirmation of insufficient manufac-
turing capacity and that a compulsory license is or will be
granted), and 4) notification of the exporting country's
compulsory license to the WTO and the conditions
attached[28]. Paragraph 4 of the Decision requires the
importing country to "take reasonable measures within
their means ... to prevent re-exportation"; this requires
countries to implement anti-diversion measures includ-
ing special marking and labelling of the product(s)[15].
An obstacle might be introduced with strict data protec-
tions laws, as exporters must either obtain authorization
from the patent holder to obtain efficacy and toxicity data
or when denied, perform its own clinical studies to collect
this data; this can increase the exporter's costs, therefore
increasing the drug cost in the importing country[28].
Additional obstacles and delays may depend on the
importing country's national laws on product registration
and the exporting company's capacity to manufacture the
specified product[28]. Lastly, the Decision limits the
exporting country's compulsory license to a "single-sup-
ply basis," implying that this entire process must repeat
for each new request[28].
Clearly, administrative barriers may hinder some develop-
ing countries from using this; however, Article 67 may be
used to obtain external assistance to overcome these gaps.
Some critics have also claimed that the Decision will not
benefit smaller-sized markets, providing minimal incen-
tive to exporting manufacturers. Paragraph 6 of the Deci-
sion may help alleviate this problem. It waives the
obligations of TRIPS article 31(f) "to the extent necessary
to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported
under a compulsory license in that member to be
exported" to other developing or LDCs that are party to
the same regional trade agreement and share the health
problem in question. Theoretically, this allows a country
like Ghana to harness economies of scale and generate
more incentive for generic manufacturers to export. How-
ever, such a regional trade area must have been formed in
conformity with the provisions of Article XXIV of
GATT[15].
To date, only Canada, Norway and the Netherlands have
passed legislation to allow export of pharmaceuticals
under this provision[29,30]. To implement Paragraph 6,
developing countries will have to address barriers intro-
duced by these exporting countries. For instance, the
recently passed Canadian bill contains a restrictive list of
medicines that can be produced for the purposes of Para-
graph 6. Norway's legislative counterpart is less restrictive.
Whether exporting countries will be able to satisfy the glo-
bal demand for affordable, generic drugs will be observed.
It is also unclear whether a developing country like Ghana
can use Paragraph 6 and if so, under what circumstances.
LDCs are automatically eligible, but since Ghana is a
developing country, it is required to examine its local
manufacturing capacity and establish that "...excluding
any capacity owned or controlled by the patent owner, it
is currently insufficient for the purposes of meeting its
needs"[15]. Ghana has been classified as a country that
can reproduce drugs as long as it imports the active ingre-
dients, therefore a cost-benefit analysis is necessary to
determine whether or not local manufacture is both tech-
nically and economically viable[10]. Whether the lack of
economic viability would be considered as "insufficient
local manufacturing capacity" in the event of a dispute is
questionable. Correa argues that if low-priced medicines
cannot be produced because "...meaningful economies of
scale have not been reached..." then one of the main
objectives of the Doha Declaration, "to promote access to
medicines for all," cannot be reached[12]. However,
reports indicate that the US informed the Philippines and
other countries that it does not consider "economic effi-
ciency" as valid ground for the use of Paragraph 6[31,32].
It is also important to note that the General Council
Chairperson's Statement on 30 August 2003, includes a
mechanism that allows any member to challenge another
member's "interpretation and implementation" of the
Decision "with a view to taking appropriate action"[16].
The legal implications of the Chairperson's Statement
must still be observed; it is unclear whether a developing
country like Ghana will be able to use Paragraph 6 with-
out legal challenge or political and/or economic conse-
quences.
Strengthen local industry capacity
The TRIPS Agreement has several provisions, which deal
explicitly with the issue of technology transfer. For
instance, article 7 states, "The protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights should contribute to technolog-
ical innovation and to transfer and disseminate technology, to
the mutual advantage of producers and users of techno-Globalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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logical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare and to a balance of rights and obli-
gations" [emphasis added]. Despite such provisions, little
technology transfer to developing countries has taken
place[33]. To strengthen local industry, developing coun-
tries like Ghana should still pursue initiatives to absorb
new technology. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) may
be one mechanism to achieve this. Generally, PPPs
require private sector companies to provide the technol-
ogy and expertise while public sector partners provide
development funding and help ensure access to the med-
ications. PPPs can facilitate technology transfer to devel-
oping and least-developed countries while creating
opportunities to initiate research into developing country
diseases[23].
Pooled Procurement
Pooled procurement is a cost-containment strategy that
can assist developing countries in financing of the drug
needs of their populations, as it is the one area of the drug
supply management cycle that can offer the greatest
amount of cost savings. For example, the Eastern Carib-
bean Drug Service (ECDS) used pooled procurement to
lower pharmaceutical expenditure by an average of
44%[34]. The recently established West Africa Manufac-
turers Association has put in place mechanisms to take
advantage of the economics of scale in the pooled pro-
curement of both raw materials and finished products. In
(Economic Community of West African States), political
realities have to be addressed given that Francophone
West-African countries are already involved in pooled
procurement procedures. Thus, if Ghana participates, it
would have to comply with established procedures.
Ghana must carefully examine the costs and benefits of
different procurement policies to determine which ones
are most viable and cost-effective. Effective implementa-
tion, to be sure, demands institutional capacity, financial
management systems, quality assurance and transpar-
ency.
Voluntary Differential Pricing Arrangements
Ghana can also pursue the procurement of affordable
drugs through voluntary differential pricing arrange-
ments. These arrangements can operate through supplier's
charity, desire for favourable public relations, or other cri-
teria not immediately or apparently related to market
forces. Currently, limited implementation of differential
pricing outside of anti-retroviral therapies occurs in
Ghana. As noted earlier, the research-based pharmaceuti-
cal industry often cites the risk of re-exportation of these
drugs to developed country markets as a barrier to scaling
up these initiatives, despite the lack of sufficient evidence.
To mitigate these concerns, pharmaceuticals firms often
require that recipients of their drugs sign a supply agree-
ment that indicates that the recipient will take measures to
ensure the security of the drug supply they receive. To fur-
ther lessen this risk, companies have special packaging
and labelling of drugs provided under special pro-
grammes like the Accelerated Access Initiative. Develop-
ing countries like Ghana can comply with these measures
with assistance from firms and established programs to
further encourage differential pricing arrangements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss several possibilities for working
within the TRIPS regime to gain better access of the popu-
lation to medicines. These options include compulsory
licensing, parallel importing, technology transfer, local
production and voluntary differential pricing. We put for-
ward some favoured policy choices for Ghana. First, we
encourage Ghana and its Access to Medicines (ATM) Advi-
sory Committee to consider local production. Local man-
ufacturing can be an effective option if human and
technological capacity is scaled up. However, we empha-
size that this option should only be pursued if it makes
economic sense. As a start, an objective cost-benefit anal-
ysis should be done to determine whether it makes eco-
nomic sense for Ghana to pursue local production.
Among the alternatives available to strengthen local
industry include more aggressive technology transfer.
Next, we encourage the use of compulsory licensing. If
Ghana decides to pursue compulsory licensing, it must
then address administrative and knowledge barriers. This
can be achieved through obtaining support from devel-
oped countries and/or international organizations on the
effective implementation of compulsory licensing. There
is great potential for Ghana particularly given the Govern-
ment's commitment to build up its knowledge base in this
area. In September 2004, members of the Ghanaian
Access to Medicines (ATM) Advisory Committee visited
Canada to learn about Canada's past experience with
compulsory licensing and what measures could be
applied to Ghana. If, however, Ghana determines that it is
more technically or economically feasible to pursue
importation, Paragraph 6 may provide an option. Ghana
will first have to establish insufficient manufacturing
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector in question, and
then consider what political or economic repercussions
may follow. More concrete alternatives for importation
include parallel importation or the voluntary tiered-pric-
ing arrangement proposed by the European Commission.
Importantly, it is critical to monitor any public policy
reform to assess whether or not they are achieving attend-
ant outcomes and adjust accordingly. This will require
baseline assessments and regular review at intervals.
The opportunities presented above can only be effective in
addressing access to medicines in Ghana if other existing
barriers are simultaneously addressed. First and foremost,Globalization and Health 2005, 1:17 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/1/1/17
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the development and implementation of an effective
exemption policy for the poor without co-payments is
vital. Policies can vary such as implementing a national
pricing policy that control prices on the supply side by
regulating actual drug costs or the demand side, through
reimbursement schemes such as reference-based pricing
or generic substitution policies. Furthermore, reduction of
mark-ups in the public sector may generate competition
and drive private sector prices down. A hard but necessary
policy reform is needed in the area of national tax, tariff
and mark-ups to determine what changes could facilitate
more affordable prices for the population.
Is the Ghana case generalisable for other African coun-
tries? We hope that as a minimum this case adds to the
debate in other African countries about public policies
they should pursue to improve access to medicines. Some
policies may be more applicable than others depending
on economic and political realities. There is not a "one-
size-fits-all" policy menu that should be applied. Govern-
ments need to make informed policy choices when it
comes to improving access to medicines and assess which
measures are most needed and viable for their particular
country.
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